[The left hand column notes refer to the appropriate sections of the Latin text of Epictetus by Johannes Schweighäuser, 1799, or his Greek and Latin version of 1798, it is not clear which. These references are taken from the last pages of the written text. The Notes for this book, that are also at the end of the volume, have been incorporated at the end of each chapter on this webpage. Click on the footnote number and you will jump to it, click on that number again, and you will leap back to that place in the text. — Elf.Ed.]
From The Teaching of Epictetus: Being the ‘Encheiridion of Epictetus,’ with Selections from the ‘Dissertations’ and ‘Fragments,’ translated from the Greek, with Introduction and Notes, by T. W. Rolleston; Chicago; Donohue, Henneberry & Co; undated; pp. 147-190.
OBLIGATIONS.
Ench. XXX. 1. Obligations are universally defined by the bonds of relation. Is such a man your father? Then it is implied that you are to take care of him, to give place to him in all things, to bear his rebukes, his chastisement. But if he be a bad father? Were you then related by any law of Nature to a good father? Nay, but simply to a father. Your brother does you wrong. Then guard your own place towards him, nor scrutinize what he is doing, but what you may do to keep your will in accord with Nature. For none other shall hurt you, if yourself choose it not, but you shall be hurt then when you conceive yourself to be so.
2. Thus shall you discover your obligations from the offices of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, if you will accustom yourself to watch the relationships.
AGAINST EPICURUS.
Diss. I. xxiii. 1. Even Epicurus is conscious that we are by nature social, but having once placed the Good in the husk,1 he cannot thereafter speak anything but what agrees with this; for again he affirms, and rightly affirms, that nothing is to be admired or received that is separated from the nature of the Good. How, then, Epicurus, do you suspect that we are social, if Nature had given us no affection for our offspring?2 Wherefore do you counsel the sage against bringing up children? Why do you fear lest he fall into sorrow by so doing? Doth he fall into sorrow for the mouse that lives in his house? What careth he if a little mouse complain to him at home. But he knows well that if a little child be born, it is no longer in our power not to love it and be anxious for it.
2. Thus, too, he saith that no man of sense will take part in affairs of the state, for he knows what he who takes part in them must do; but what should hinder one to take part, if he may behave among men as in a swarm of flies? But Epicurus, 149 knowing these things, dares to say that we should not rear up our children. But even a sheep will not desert its young, nor a wolf; and shall a man? What! will you have us to be silly creatures, like the sheep? Yet they desert not their young. Or savage, like wolves? Yet even they desert them not. Come, then, who would obey you if he saw his little child fall on the ground and cry? For my part, I suppose that had it been prophesied to your mother and your father that you would say these things, not even so would they have cast you out.
Diss. II. v. 24-30. 3. But how can it be said of these outward things3 that they are according to Nature, or contrary to Nature? That is to speak as if we were solitary and disunited from others. For to the foot I shall say it is according to Nature that it be clean; but if you take it as a foot, and not as a solitary thing, it shall beseem it to go into the mud, and to tread on thorns, and perchance to be cut off, for the sake of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot.
4. And some such thing we should suppose about ourselves also. What art thou? A man. Look at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is according to Nature to live to old age, to grow rich, to keep good health. But if thou look at thyself as a man, and as a part of a certain Whole, for the sake of that Whole it may become thee now to have sickness, now to sail the seas and run 150 into peril, now to suffer need, and perchance to die before thy time.
5. Why, then, dost thou bear it hard? Knowest thou not, that as the foot alone is not a foot, so thou alone art not a man? For what is a man? A part of a polity, first of that which is made up of Gods and men; then of that which is said to be next to the other, which is a small copy of the Universal Polity.
6. Then must I now be brought to trial, and now must another have a fever, and another sail the seas, another die, another be sentenced? Yea, for with such a body, in the bounds of such a universe, in such a throng of inhabitants, it cannot be but that different things of this nature should fall on different persons. This is thy task, then, having come into the world, to speak what thou shouldst, and to order these things as it is fitting.
7. Then some one saith, I charge you with wrong-doing. Much good may it do thee! I have done my part — look to it thyself if thou have done thine, for of this too there is some danger, lest it escape thee.
NOTES
1 The husk is, of course, the body. If it is maintained that Nature has made the ease of this our only proper pursuit, of course the altruistic, or social instincts have to be rejected and denied.
2 The text is here almost certainly corrupt. It runs πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἑσμεν, οἶς μὴ φυσική ἑστι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργία. All the MSS. agree in ὑπονοητικοί, for which Schweighäuser desires to read προνοητικοί, and Wolf, ἔπι κοινωνικοί. Salmasius declares emphatically for πῶς οὖν ἐπινοεῖς ὅτι κοινωνικοί ἑσμεν, and this, with a slight alteration suggested to me by an eminent living scholar, is the reading I have adopted. Let us suppose that Epictetus said πῶς οὖν ὑπονοεῖς ὄτι κ.ε., and that this was written in the short lines common in Greek MSS.: —
ΠΩΣΟΥΝΥΠΟ
ΝΟΕΙΣΟΤΙΚΟΙ
ΝΩΝΙΚΟΙ
The second line, beginning with the same letter as the third, might easily be dropped by a transcriber, and the next transcriber would certainly change the resulting ὑπονωνικοί to ὑπονοητικοί. The existing reading might give the sense, “How are we, then, suspicious of those (if any there be) to whom Nature has given no affection for their offspring?”
3 Outward things — such as making provision for one’s family, serving the State, etc., — actions which are not directly concerned with our spiritual good.
AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS.
Diss. II. xx. 1-27 1. Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man 151 might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged to affirm the contrary, the negation — that there is nothing universally true. Slave! not even this — for what is this but to say that if there is anything universal it is falsehood!
2. Again, if one should come and say. Know that nothing can be known, but all things are incapable of proof; or another, Believe me, and it shall profit thee, that no man ought to believe any man; or again, another, Learn from me, O man, that it is not possible to learn anything, and I tell thee this, and I will teach thee, if thou wilt — now wherein do such men differ from those — whom shall I say? — those who call themselves Academics? Assent, O men, that no man can assent to aught; believe us that no man can believe any one.
3. Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For what saith he? Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor mistaken — there is no natural fellowship among reasonable beings, believe me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms. What is that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all other men are persuaded 152 that we have a natural fellowship with one another, and that we should in all ways maintain it? Nay — but much the better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost thou write so many books, lest any of us should be deceived about the Gods, in supposing that they cared for men? or lest any one should take the essence of the Good to be anything else than Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, whereof thou hast judged thyself fit; eat and drink and cohabit and ease thyself and snore. What is it to thee how other men think concerning these matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What hast thou to do with us? With sheep hast thou some concern, for that they serve us when they are shorn, and when they are milked, and at last when they have their throats cut. Were it not, then, to be desired, if men could be lulled and charmed to slumber by the Stoics, and give themselves to thee and the like of thee, to be shorn and milked? These things shouldst thou say to thy brother Epicureans; but shouldst thou not keep them hidden from other men, and seek in every way to persuade them above all things that we are by nature social, and that temperance is good; in order that everything may be kept for thee? Or should we preserve 153 this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom, then, should we preserve it? With those who also preserve it towards us, or with those who transgress it? And who transgresses it more than ye, who set forth such doctrines?
4. What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write the things he wrote? What else than Nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to her will. For, saith she, since it seems to thee that there is no fellowship among men, write this down, and deliver it to others, and watch and wake for this, and be thyself by thine own deed the accuser of thine own opinions. Shall we, then, say that Orestes was driven by the Furies and aroused from sleep, and did not crueller Furies and Avengers rouse this man as he slumbered, and suffered him not to rest, but compelled him, as madness and wine the priests of Cybele,1 to proclaim his own evils? So mighty and invincible a thing is man’s nature.
5. For how can a vine be affected, and not in the manner of a vine, but of an olive? Or how, again, can an olive be affected not in the manner of an olive but of a vine? It is impossible, it cannot be conceived. Neither, then, is it possible for a man wholly to lose the affections of humanity, for even eunuchs cannot cut away for themselves the 154 desires of men. And thus Epicurus has cut away all that belongs to a man as father of a family, and as citizen, and as friend; but the desires of humanity he hath not cut away, for he could not; no more than these pitiful Academics are able to cast away or to blind their own perceptions, although this is the thing that they have striven with all their zeal to do.
6. How shameful is this! that a man having received from Nature measures and canons for the recognition of truth, should study not to add to them and perfect them where they are wanting, but the very contrary of this; if there be anything that may lead us to the knowledge of the truth, they strive to abolish and destroy it.
7. What sayest thou, philosopher? religion and holiness, what dost thou take them for?2
— “If thou wilt, I shall prove that they are good.”
So be it; prove it then, in order that our citizens may be converted and honor the Divinity, and be no longer neglectful of the greatest things.
— “Now hast thou received the proofs?:
I have, and am thankful therefor.
8. — “Now since thou art exceedingly well pleased with these things, hear the contrary: There are no Gods, or if there be, they have no care for men, nor have we any communion with them; and this religion 155 and holiness, whereof the multitude babble, is the lying of impostors and sophists, or of legislators, by Zeus! for the frighting and restraining of evil-doers.”
Well said, philosopher! the citizens shall have much profit of thee! thou hast already brought back all our youths to the contempt of sacred things.
—— “What now? are these doctrines not pleasing to thee? Learn, then, that Righteousness is nothing, that Reverence is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.”
Well said, philosopher! proceed, persuade the young, that we may multiply the number of those who believe and speak with thee. From these teachings have grown our well-governed States, from these did Sparta spring, and these beliefs, by his laws and discipline, did Lycurgus plant among his people: — That slavery is no more base than honorable, nor to be free men more honorable than base. Through these opinions died those who fell at Thermopylæ, and through what others did the Athenians forsake their city?3
9. Then those who speak such things marry, and beget children, and take part in public affairs, and make themselves priests and augurs — of what? Of beings, that do not exist! and they question the Pythian oracle that they may learn falsehoods; and they declare the oracles to others. O monstrous impudence and imposture!
NOTES
1 Phrygia, the birth-place of Epictetus, was one of the great centers of the wild and fearful cult of Cybele, whose priests gashed and mutilated themselves in the excitement of the orgie.
2 Philosophy is brought upon the scene, speaking first through the mouth of a Stoic, afterwards through that of an Epicurean, and the practical results of each system are exhibited.
3 The Athenians, rather than submit to Xerxes, abandoned their city to be plundered, and took to their fleet, the victory at Salamis rewarding their resolve.
Those who died at Thermopylæ were the three hundred Spartans under Leonidas, who held the pass against the Persian host till all were slain. Often as their heroism has been celebrated, perhaps nothing more worthy of their valor has been written than the truly laconic epitaph composed for them by Simonides:
“Stranger, the Spartans bade us die:
Go, tell them, thou, that here we lie.”
ON SLAVERY.
Diss. I. xiii. 1. A certain man having inquired how one may make his meals in a manner pleasing to the Gods, If he do it uprightly, said Epictetus, and considerately, and equably, and temperately, and orderly, shall it not also be thus pleasing to the Gods? But when you ask for hot water, and the boy does not hear, or, hearing, brings it only luke-warm; or if he is not even to be found in the house, then is it not pleasing to the Gods if you refrain from indignation, and do not burst with passion? How shall one endure such fellows? Wretch, wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, who is of the progeny of Zeus, like a son sprung of the same seed as thyself, and of the same heavenly descent, but thou must straightway make thyself a tyrant, for the place of command in which thou art set? Wilt thou not remember who thou art, and whom thou rulest — that they are kinsmen, brethren by nature, the progeny of Zeus? But I have bought them, and they have not bought me! Seest thou, then, whither thou art looking — towards the earth, towards the pit of perdition, towards these miserable laws of dead 157 men? but towards the laws of the Gods thou dost not look.
Frag. XLIII., XLIV. 2. That which thou wouldst not suffer thyself, seek not to lay upon others. Thou wouldst not be a slave — look to it that others be not slaves to thee. For if thou endure to have slaves, it seems that thou thyself art first of all a slave. For virtue had no communion with vice nor freedom with slavery.
3. As one who is in health would not choose to be served by the sick, nor that those dwelling with him should be sick, so neither would one that is free bear to be served by slaves, or that those living with him should be slaves.1
NOTE
1 The sense of human dignity was strong in Epictetus, and he would have it practically observed in men’s relations with each other. Compare Ch. v. 7. Zeller must have overlooked these Fragments of Epictetus when he asserted (p. 301) that no Stoic philosopher had ever condemned slavery. So far as we know, however, this is the only condemnation of that institution ever uttered by any Pagan thinker. The usual Stoic view was laid down by Chrysippus, who defined the slave very much as Carlyle does, as a “perpetuus mercenarius” — a man “hired for life, from whom work was to be required, a just return for it being accorded” (operam exegendam, justa præbenda). This utterance of Epictetus, as of one who knew slavery from within, and certainly was not inclined to exaggerate its discomforts, is noteworthy enough.
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES, WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN.
Diss. III. vii. 1. The Administrator1 having visited him (and this man was an Epicurean). It is proper, said Epitectus, that ignorant people like us should inquire of you that are philosophers (as men who come into a strange city make inquiry of the citizens and those familiar with the place) what is the chief thing in the world, to the end that, having learned it, we may go in search of it, and behold it, as men do with objects in the cities.
1582. Now, that there are three things with which man is concerned — soul, and body, and the outer world — scarce any one will deny. It remaineth, then, for men like ye to answer which is the chief of these things? What shall we declare to men? Is it the flesh? And was it for this that Maximus sent forth his son, and sailed with him through the tempest as far as Cassiope,2 for somewhat that he should feel in the flesh?
3. But the Epicurean denying this, and saying, God forbid, Epitectus said:
Is it not fit, then, that we should be zealous about that, the chief thing?
— “Of all things most fit.”
What, then, have we greater than the flesh?
— “The soul,” he said.
And the good of the chief thing, is it greater then the good of the lower thing?
— “The good of the chief thing is greater.”
And the good things of the soul, are they in the power of the Will, or beyond the Will?
— “They are in the power of the Will.”
The pleasure of the soul, then, is within the power of the Will?
He assented.
And this pleasure itself, whence may it arise? From itself? But this is inconceivable; for we must suppose some original substance of the Good, whereof the soul 159 doth make us sensible when we light upon it.
This, too, he admitted.
Wherein, then, are we sensible of this spiritual pleasure? for if it be in spiritual things, the nature of the Good is discovered. For the Good cannot be something different from the thing that justly delights us; nor, if the original thing be not good, can aught be good that proceeds from it; for, in order that the thing proceeding may be good, the original thing must be good also. But this ye would never say, if ye had your wits, for so ye would speak things that agree not with Epicurus and the rest of your opinions. It remains, then, that we are conscious in bodily things of this pleasure of the soul, and again, that these are the original things and the very substance of the Good.3
4. Wherefore Maximus did foolishly if he made his voyage for the sake of anything else than the flesh; that is, than the chief thing. And any man doth foolishly who restraineth himself from others’ good, if he be a judge, and able to take them. But, if you please, let us regard this only, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that none may know it. For neither does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad, but only to be caught stealing; and because it is impossible to be certain of no discovery, therefore he saith, Ye shall not steal. But I say that if we steal with skill and discretion, 160 we shall not be caught. And, moreover, if we have powerful friends among men amd women of Rome, and the Greeks are feeble, no one will dare to go thither on this score. Why do you refrain from your own good? This is foolish — this is absurd. But not even if you tell me you do refrain will I believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to anything that appeareth to be a falsehood or to turn away from what appeareth to be true, even so it is impossible to withhold oneself from anything that appeareth to be good. But riches are a good, and, at all events, the most potent means of pleasure. Wherefore, then, not compass them? And why not corrupt our neighbor’s wife, if we may do it secretly? and also, if the husband talk nonsense about it, let us fling him out! If you will be a true and perfect philosopher, and obedient to your own doctrines, thus must you do; but if you do not, you differ no whit from us that are called Stoics. For truly we ourselves say one thing and do another; we speak fair and honest things, and do vile ones. But the opposite distemper will be thine — a vile creed and honorable deeds.
5. And you think, God help you! of a city of Epicureans? I do not marry. Nor I; for it is not right to marry, nor beget children, nor take part in public affairs. What will come to pass then? Whence shall we have citizens? who shall educate 161 them? who shall be the overseer of youth?4 who the director of gymnastics? and how shall the youth be trained up? as the Lacedæmonians? or as the Athenians? Take me a youth, and bring him up after these doctrines of thine! Evil are they, subversive of States, mischievous to households, unbecoming to women. Abandon them, man! Thou dwellest in a chief city; it is thy part to rule, to judge righteously, to refrain from other men’s goods; nor must any woman seem beautiful to thee save thine own wife, nor vessel of gold or silver. Seek for doctrines in harmony with these words, from which setting out thou mayest with gladness abandon things so potent to attract and overcome. But if beside the seduction of these things we have sought out some philosophy like this that pushes us towards them, and confirms us in them, what shall come of it?
6. In the graver’s work, which is the chief thing? the silver or the art? The substance of the hands is flesh, but the main things are the works of the hand. The obligations, therefore, are also three — those that concern us, firstly, in that we are; and secondly, as we are; and thirdly, the main things themselves. And thus in man, too, it is not meet to value the material, this flesh, but the main things. What are these? To take part in public affairs, to marry, to beget children, to fear God, to care for parents, 162 and, in general, to pursue, to avoid, to desire, to dislike, as each of these things should be done, as Nature made us to do. And how made she us? To be free, generous, pious. For what other creature blushes? what other is capable of the sense of shame?
7. And to these things let Pleasure be subject as a minister, a servant, that she may summon forth our ardor, and that she also may aid in works that are according to Nature.5
— “But I am a wealthy man, and have no need of aught.”
Why, then, dost thou profess philosophy? Thy vessels of gold and vessels of silver are enough for thee; what need hast thou of doctrines?
— “But I am also a judge of the Greeks!”
Dost thou know how to judge — who made thee know?
— “Cæsar wrote me a commission.”
Let him write thee a commission to be a judge of music, and what help will it be to thee? And how didst thou become a judge? by kissing of what man’s hand? Was it that of Symphorus or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber didst thou sleep? To whom didst thou send gifts? Dost thou not perceive, then, that to be a judge is worth just as much as Numenius is worth?
— “But I can cast into prison whom I will.”
163As if he were a stone.
— “But I can flog any man I will.”
As if he were an ass. This is no government of men. Rule us as reasoning beings; show us what is for our good, and we shall follow it; show us what is for our ill, and we shall turn away from it; make us emulators of thyself, as Socrates made his disciples. He, indeed, was one that governed men as men, who made them subject unto him in their pursuit and their avoidance, their desire and dislike. Do this, do not this, or I will cast thee into prison. This is not the rule of reasoning beings. But, As Zeus hath ordered, so do thou act; but if thou dost not, thou shall suffer loss and hurt. What hurt? None other than this — not to have done what it behooved thee do do. Thou shalt lose faith, piety, decency — look for no greater injuries than these.
NOTES
1 Administrator, διορθωτής; in Latin, Corrector — a State officer of whom inscriptions, etc., make frequent mention, but of whose functions not much appears to be known beyond what the present chapter of Epictetus reveals.
2 Cassiope was a port of Epirus, not far from Nicopolis, where Epictetus taught. Schw. conjectures that Maximus was sending his son to study philosophy at Nicopolis under Epictetus.
3 “For a correct view of these matters will reduce every movement of preference and avoidance to health of body and tranquillity of soul; for this is the perfection of a happy life.” — Epicurus, Diog. Laert. x. 128. Epictetus’s analysis of the Epicurean theory amounts to this, that the pleasure of the soul is the chief good, but that it is only felt through the body and its conditions.
4 The overseer of youth. — An officer in certain Greek cities. See Mahaffy’s Greek Life and Thought, ch. xvii., on the organization of the ephebi.
5 Aid in works that are according to Nature. — The Greek is — ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις παρακρατῆ. There is some difference of opinion among commentators as to the meaning of παρακρατῆ. Wolf translates, “hold the chief place” in natural works. Upton, Schw., and Long render it by “keep us constant,” “sustain us,” in such works. I do not see why we should not take the word in its plainest sense — that pleasure should act together with other forces in leading us to do well.
ON STATECRAFT.
Frag. LXXXII.
1. Not with the stones of Eubœa and Sparta let the structure of your city walls be variegated; but let the discipline and teaching that comes from Greece penetrate with order the minds of citizens and statesmen. For with the thoughts of men are cities well established, and not with wood and stone.
164
Frag. XLV. 2. If thou wouldst have a household well established, then follow the example of the Spartan Lycurgus. For even as he did not fence the city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants with virtue, and so preserved the city free for ever, thus do thou not surround thyself with a great court and set up lofty towers, but confirm the dwellers in the house with good-will, and faith, and friendliness, and no harmful thing shall enter; no, not if the whole army of evil were arrayed against it.
Frag. LXVII. 3. Which of us will not admire Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian? For having lost an eye at the hands of one of the citizens, and having received the young man from the people that he should punish him as he would, he refrained from thus; but having taught him and proved him to be a good man, he brought him into the theater. And when the Lacedæmonians marveled, I received this man from you, he said, insolent and violent; I give him back to you mild and civil.
ON FRIENDSHIP.
Diss. II. xxii. 1. Whereinsoever a man is zealous, this, it is fair to suppose, he loveth. Are men, then, zealous for evil things? Never.1 Or, perchance, for things which do not concern them? Nor for them either. It remaineth, 165 then, that they are zealous about good things only; and that if they are zealous about them, they also love them. Whosoever, then, hath understanding of good things, the same would know how to love. But he who is not able to distinguish good things from evil, and things that are neither from both, how could this man yet be capable of loving? To love, then, is a quality of the wise alone.
2. And how is this, saith one, for I am foolish, and none the less do I love my child. By the Gods! I wonder, then, how you have begun by confessing yourself to be foolish. For wherein do you lack? Do you not use your senses? do you not judge of appearances? do you not bring to the body the nourishment it needeth, and the covering and the habitation? Wherefore, then, confess yourself to be a fool? Because, forsooth, you are often perplexed by appearances, and troubled, and you are vanquished by their plausibility; and you take the same things to be now good, and now evil, and then indifferent; and, in a word, you grieve and fear and envy, and are troubled, an changed — for these things you confess yourself a fool.
3. But do you never change in love? But is it wealth, and pleasure, and, in short, things alone that you sometimes take to be good and sometimes evil? and do you not take the same men to be now good, now 166 evil? and sometimes you are friendly disposed towards them, and sometimes hostile? and sometimes you praise them, and sometimes you blame?
— “Yea, even so I do.”
What then? a man who hath been deceived about another, is he, think you, his friend?
— “Assuredly not.”
And one who hath taken a friend out of a humor for change, hath he good-will towards him?
— “Nor he either.”
And he who now reviles another, and afterwards reveres him?
— “Nor he.”
What then? Sawest thou never the whelps of a dog, how they fawn and sport with each other, that you would say nothing can be more loving? But to know what friendship is, fling a piece of flesh among them, and thou shalt learn. And cast between thee and thy child a scrap of land, and thou shalt learn how the child will quickly wish to bury thee, and thou wilt pray that he may die. And then thou wilt say, What a child have I nourished! this long time he is burying me! Throw a handsome girl between you, and the old man will love her, and the young too;2 and if it be glory, or some risk to run, it will be on the same fashion. You will speak the words of the father of Admetus3: —
167“Day gladdens thee; think’st thou it glads not me?
Thou lovest light; think’st thou I love the dark?”
Think you this man did not love his own child when it was little? nor was in agony if it had a fever? nor said many a time, Would that I ha the fever rather than he! Then when the trial cometh and is near at hand, lo, what words they utter! And Eteocles and Polyneices,4 were they not children of the same mother and the same father? were they not brought up together, did they not live together, drink together, sleep together, and often kiss one another? So that any one who saw them, I think, would have laughed at the philosophers, for the things they say perversely about friendship. But when royalty, like a piece of flesh, hath fallen between them, hear that things they speak: —
“Pol. Where wilt thou stand before the towers?
Et. Wherefore seekest thou to know?
Pol. There I too would stand and slay thee.
Et. Thou hast spoken my desire.”
4. For universally, be not deceived, nothing is so dear to any creature as its own profit. Whatsoever may seem to hinder this, be it father or child or friend or lover, this he will hate and abuse and curse. For Nature hath never so made anything as to love aught but its own profit: this is father and brother and kin and country and God. When, then, the Gods appear to hinder us in 168 this, we revile even them, and overthrow their images and burn their temples; as Alexander, when his friend died, commanded to burn the temples of Esculapius.
5. Therefore, if a man place in the same thing both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and fatherland, and parents and friends, all these things shall be saved; but if he place profit in one thing, and friends and fatherland and kinsfolk, yea, and righteousness itself some other where, all these things shall perish, for profit shall outweigh them. For where the I and the Mine are, thither, of necessity, inclineth every living thing: if in the flesh, then the supremacy is there; if in the Will, it is there; if in outward things, it is there. If, then, mine I is where my Will is, thus only shall I be the friend I should be, or the son or the father. For my profit then will be to cherish faith and piety and forbearance and continence and helpfulness; and to guard the bonds of relation. But if I set Myself in one place and Virtue some otherwhere, then the word of Epicurus waxeth strong, which declareth that there is no Virtue, or, at least, that Virtue is but conceit.
6. Through this ignorance did Athenians and Lacedæmonians quarrel with each other, and Thebans with both of them, and the Great King with Hellas, and Macedonians with both of them, and even now Romans with Getæ; and through this yet earlier the wars of Ilion arose. Paris was the guest 169 of Menelaus; and if any one had seen how friendly-minded towards each other they were, he would have disbelieved any one who said they were not friends. But a morsel was flung between them — a fair woman, and about her there was war. And now when you see friends or brothers that seem to be of one mind, argue nothing from this concerning their friendship; nay, not if they swear it, not if they declare that they cannot be parted from each other. For in the ruling faculty of a worthless man there is no faith; it is unstable, unaccountable, victim of one appearance after another. But try them, not, as others do, if they were born of the same parents and nurtured together, and under the same tutor; but by this alone, wherein they place their profit, whether in outward things or in the Will. If in outward things, call them no more friends than faithful or steadfast or bold or free; yea, nor even men, if you had sense. For that opinion hath nothing of humanity that makes men bite each other, and revile each other, and haunt the wildernesses, or the public places, like the mountains,5 and in the courts of justice to show forth the character of thieves; nor that which makes men drunkards and adulterers and corruptors, nor whatever other ills men work against each other through this one and only opinion, that They and Theirs lie in matters beyond the Will. But if you hear, in sooth, 170 that these men hold the Good to be there only where the Will is, where the right use of appearances is, then be not busy to inquire if they are father and son, or brothers, or have long time companied with each other as comrades; but, knowing this one thing alone, argue confidently that they are friends, even as they are faithful and upright. For where else is friendship than where faith is, where piety is, where there is an interchange of virtue, and none of other things than that?
7. But such a one hath shown kindness to me so long, and is he not my friend? Slave, whence knowest thou if he did not show thee kindness as he wipes his shoes or tends his beast? Whence knowest thou if, when thy use is at an end as a vessel, he will not cast thee away like a broken plate? But she is my wife, and we have lived together so long? And how long lived Eriphyle with Amphiaraus, and was the mother, yea, of many children? But a necklace came between them.6 But what is a necklace? It is the opinion men have concerning such things. That was the wild beast nature, that was the sundering of love, that which would not allow the woman to be a wife, or the mother a mother. And of you, whosoever hath longed either to be a friend himself or to win some other for a friend, let him cut out these opinions, let him hate them and drive them from his soul.
1718. And thus he will not revile himself, nor be at strife with himself, nor be variable, nor torment himself. And to another, if it be one like himself, he will be altogether as to himself, but with one unlike he will be forbearing and gentle and mild, ready to forgive him as an ignorant man, as one who is astray about the greatest things; but harsh to no man, being well assured of that dogma of Plato, that no soul is willingly deprived of the truth.
9. But otherwise you may do all things whatsoever, even as friends are wont to do, and drink together, and dwell together, and voyage together, and be born from the same parents, for so are snakes; but friends they are not, nor are ye, so long as ye hold these accursed doctrines of wild beasts.
NOTES
1 Zealous for evil things. — Epictetus must mean things which they know to be evil — evil things as evil. It was a Socratic doctrine which we find again alluded to in this chapter, that no evil is ever willingly or wittingly done.
2 A favorite theme of later Greek and of Roman comedy was the rivalship in love of a father and a son.
3 Admetus, husband of Alcestis, being told by an oracle that his wife must die if no one offered himself in her stead, thought to lay the obligation on his father, as being an old man with but few more years to live. The first verse quoted is from the Alcestis of Euripides; the second is not found in any extant version of that play.
4 Eteocles and Polyneices, sons of Œdipus, quarreled with each other about the inheritance of their father’s kingdom. Eteocles having gained possession of it, Polyneices brought up the famous seven kings, his allies, against Thebes, and fell in battle there by his brother’s hand, whom he also killed. The verses quoted are from the Phœnissæ of Euripides.
5 Schweighäuser interprets this passage to mean that these men occupy the public places as wild beasts do the mountains, to prey on others. If we might read ὡς τὰ θηρία for ὡς τὰ ὄρη, we should get a less obscure sense, “haunt the wilderness — I should say the public places — like wild beasts.” The passage is clearly corrupt somewhere.
6 Polyneices bribed Eriphyle with the gift of this necklace to persuade her unwilling husband to march with him against Thebes where he died.
TIME AND CHANGE.
Diss. III. xxiv. 1-49. 1. Let not another’s vice be thy evil. For thou wast not born to be abject with others, or unfortunate with others, but to prosper with them. But if any one is unfortunate, remember, that it is of his own doing. For God hath made all men to be happy, and of good estate. For this end hath He granted means and occasions, giving 172 some things to each man as his own concern, and some things as alien; and the things that are hindered and subject to compulsion and lost are not his own concern, and those that are unhindered are; and the substance of Good and of Evil, as it were worthy of Him that careth for us and doth protect us as a father, He hath placed among our own concerns.
2. — “But I have parted from such a one, and he is grieved.”
For why did he deem things alien to be his own concern? Why, when he rejoiced to see thee, did he not reason that thou wert mortal, and apt to travel to another land? Therefore doth he pay the penalty of his own folly. But thou, for what cause or reason dost thou bewail thyself? Hast thou also given no thought to these things; but like silly women consort with all that pleased thee as though thou shouldst consorted with them forever, places and persons and pastimes? and now thou sittest weeping, because thou canst see the same persons and frequent the same places no longer. This, truly, is what thou art fit for, to be more wretched than crows and ravens that can fly whithersoever they please, and change their nests, and pass across the seas, nor ever lament nor yearn for what they have left.
— “Yea, but they are thus because they are creatures without any reason.”
173To us, then, was Reason given by the Gods for our misfortune and misery? that we should be wretched and sorrowful forever? Let all men be immortal, forsooth, and no man migrate to another land, nor let us ourselves ever migrate, but remain rooted to one spot like plants; and if one of our companions go, let us sit down and weep, and if he return, dance and clap hands like children!
3. Shall we not now at least wean ourselves, and remember what we heard from the philosophers? if, indeed, we did not listen to them as a wizard’s incantation. For they said that the universe is one Polity, and one is the substance out of which it is made, and there must, of necessity, be a certain cycle, and some things must give place to others, some dissolving away, and others coming into being, some abiding in one place, and others being in motion. But all things are full of love, first of the Gods, then of men, that are by nature made to have affection towards each other; and it must needs be that some dwell with each other, and some are separated, rejoicing in those who are with them, and not distressed for those who go away. And man, they said, is magnanimous by nature, and contemneth all things beyond the Will; and hath also this quality, not to be rooted to one spot, nor grown into the earth, but able to go from place to place, sometimes urged 174 by divers needs, sometimes for the sake of what he shall see.
4. And such was the case with Ulysses: —
“The cities of many people and minds of men he
knew.” — Od. i. 3.
And yet earlier with Hercules, who went about the whole earth —
“All disorders of men and orderly rule to see,”
— Od. xvii. 487.
casting out and purging the one, and bringing in the other in its place. And how many friends, think you, had he in Thebes? how many in Argos? how many in Athens? and how many did he gain in his journeyings? And he took a wife, too, when it seemed to him due time, and begat children, and left them behind him, not with lamentations or regrets, nor leaving them as orphans; for he knew that no man is an orphan, but that there is an Eternal Father who careth continually for all. For not of report alone had he heard that Zeus is the Father of men, whom also he thought to be his own father, and called Him so, and all that he did, he did looking unto Him. And thus it was that he was able to live happily in every place.
5. For never can happiness and the longing for what is not exist together. For Happiness must have all its will. It is like unto one that hath eaten and is filled; thirst 175 will not sort with it, nor hunger. But Ulysses longed for his wife, and lamented as he at on the rock.1 And do you, then, follow Homer and his stories in everything? Or if he did in truth lament, what else was he than an unfortunate man? And what good man is unfortunate? Verily, the Whole is ill-governed if Zeus taketh no care of his own citizens, that they like himself may be happy; but these things it is not lawful nor pious even to think if. But Ulysses, if indeed he lamented and complained, was not a good man. For what good man is there that knoweth not who he is? and who knoweth this who forgets that things which come into existence also perish, and that no two human beings dwell together forever? To aim, then, at things which are impossible is a contemptible and foolish thing; it is the part of a stranger and alien in God’s world who fights against God in the one way he can — by his own opinions.
6. But my mother laments if she sees me not. And wherefore hath she never learned these teachings? Yet, I say not that it is no concern of ours to prevent her grieving; but that we should not absolutely, and without exception, desire what is not our own. And the grief of another is another’s, and my grief is mine own. I will, therefore, absolutely end mine own grief, for this I can; and that of another according to my means, but this I will not attempt absolutely. 176 For otherwise I shall be fighting with God. I shall be opposing and resisting Him in the government of the Whole; and of this strife against God, this obstinacy, not only my children’s children, but I myself, too, shall pay the penalty by day and night; for I shall leap from my bed at visions of the night, confounded, trembling at every news, having my peace at the mercy of letters of other persons. A messenger hath come from Rome; God grant it be no evil. But what evil can come upon thee there, where thou art not? There is a message from Greece; God grant it be no evil. And thus to thee every place may be a source of misfortune. Is it not enough for thee to be unfortunate where thou art, and not also across the sea, and by writings? Is this the security of thine affairs? But what if my friends which are abroad die there? What else than that creatures destined to die have died? And how dost thou desire to live to old age, and never to see the death of any whom thou lovest? Knowest thou not that in a great length of time many and various things must chance; that a fever shall overthrow one, and a robber another, and a tyrant another? Such is our environment, such our companions; cold and heat, and improper ways of living, and journeyings, and voyagings, and winds, and various circumstances will destroy one man, and exile another, and casts another into an embassy, and another into a campaign. Sit 177 down, then, terrified at all these things; grieve and fail, and be unfortunate; depend on others, and that not on one or two, but myriads upon myriads.
7. Is this what you heard, is this what you learned from the philosophers? Know you not that our business here is a warfare? and one must watch, and one go out as a spy, and one must fight? All cannot be the same thing, nor would it be better if they were. But you neglect to do the bidding of the commander, and complain when he hath laid somewhat rougher than common upon you; and you mark not what, so far as in you lies, you are making the army to become, so that if all copy you, none will dig a trench, none will cast up a rampart, none will watch, none will run any risk, but each will appear worthless for warfare. Again, in a ship, if you go for a sailor, take up one place, and never budge from it; and if you are wanted to go aloft, refuse; or to run upon the prow, refuse; and what captain will have patience with you? Will he not cast you out like some useless thing, nothing else than a hindrance and bad example to the other sailors?
8. And thus here also: the life of every man is a sort of warfare, and a long one, and full of divers chances. And it behooveth a man to play a soldier’s part, and do all at the nod of his commander; yea, and if it be possible, to divine what he intendeth. For that commander is not such a one as this, 178 neither in power nor in exaltation of character. You are set in a great office, and in no mean place, but are a Senator forever. Know you not that such a one can attend but little to his household, but he must be oftentimes abroad, ruling or being ruled, or fulfilling some office, or serving in the field, or judging? And will you, then, desire to be fixed and rooted like a plant in the same place? For it is pleasant. Who denies it? But so is a dainty pleasant, and a fair woman is pleasant. How otherwise are those wont to speak who make pleasure their end? See you not what kind of men they are whose words you utter? They are the words of Epicureans and profligates. And doing the works of these men, and holding their doctrines, wilt thou speak to us with the speech of Zeno and Socrates?
9. Will you not fling away from you as far as you can these alien sentiments wherewith you adorn yourself, which beseem you not at all? What other desire have such men than to sleep their fill unhindered, and when they have risen, to yawn for languor, and wash their face, and write and read whatever pleaseth them; then have some trivial talk, and be praised by their friends, whatever they say; then go forth to walk about, and having done this a little, go to the baths; then eat; then retire to rest — such a rest as is the wont of such men, and why need we say what, for it is easily 179 guessed? Come, tell me, then, thine own way of life, such as thou desirest, O thou votary of the truth, and of Socrates and Diogenes! What wilt thou do in Athens? these very things, or others? Why, then, dost declare thyself a Stoic? Are not they sorely punished which falsely pretend to be Roman citizens; and should those go free who falsely pretend to so great and reverend a calling and name? or let this indeed be impossible; but this is the law, divine and mighty, and not to be escaped, that layeth the greatest punishments on the greatest sinners. For what saith the law? He who pretendeth to things that are not his own, let him be a cheat and braggart; he that is disobedient to the divine government, let him be an abject, a slave, let him grieve and envy and pity2 — in a word, let him be misfortunate, and mourn,
10. — “And now will you have me attend upon such a one, and hang about his doors?”
If Reason demand it, for the sake of country, of kinsmen, of mankind, wherefore shouldst thou not go? Thou art not ashamed to go to the doors of a cobbler when thou art in want of shoes, nor to those of a gardener for lettuces; and why to those of a rich man when thou art in need of some like thing?
— “Yea, but I have no awe of the cobbler.”
180Then have none of the rich.
— “Nor will I flatter the gardener.”
And do not flatter the rich.
—— “How, then, shall I gain what I want?
Did I say to thee, Go, for the sake of gaining it; or did I not only say, Go, that thou mayest do what it beseems thee to do.
— “And why, then, should I yet go?”
That thou mayest have gone; that thou mayest have played the part of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And, for the rest, remember that the shoe-maker, the vegetable-seller, to whom thou didst go, hath nothing great or exalted to give, even though he sell it dear. Thy aim was lettuces; they are worth an obol, they are not worth a talent. And so it is here. Is the matter worth going to the rich man’s door for? So be it; I will go. Is it worth speaking to him about? So be it; I will speak. But must I also kiss his hand, and fawn upon him with praise? Out upon it! that is a talent’s worth. It is no profit to me, nor to the State, nor to my friends, that they should lose a good citizen and friend.
Diss. III. xxiv. 58-63. 11. — “How, then shall I become of an affectionate disposition?
In having a generous and happy one. For Reason doth never decree that a man must be abject, or lament, or depend on one another, or blame God or man. And thus be thou affectionate, as one who will keep 181 this faith. But if through this affection or what happens to be so called by thee, thou art like to prove a miserable slave, then it shall not profit thee to be affectionate. And what hinders us to love as though we loved a mortal, or one who may depart to other lands? Did Socrates not love his children? Yea, but as a free man; as one who remembered that he must first love the Gods. And, therefore, he never did transgress anything that it becomes a good man to observe, neither in his defense, nor in fixing his punishment, nor beforetime when he was of the Council, nor when he was serving in the field. But we are well supplied with every excuse for baseness; some through children, some through mothers, some through brothers. But it behooveth no man to be unhappy through any person, but happy through all, and most of all through God, which hath framed us to that end.
Diss. III. xxiv. 88-93. 12. And, for the rest, in all things which are delightful to thee, set before thyself the appearances that oppose them. What harm is it, while kissing thy child, to whisper, To-morrow thou shall die; and likewise with thy friend, To-morrow thou shall depart, either thou or I, and we shall see each other no more?
— “But these are words of ill-omen.
And so are some incantations, but in that they are useful I regard not this; only let them be of use. But dost thou call anything of ill-omen, save only that which betokeneth 182 some evil? Cowardice is a word of ill-omen, and baseness and grief and mourning and shamelessness, these words are of ill-omen. And not even them must we dread to speak, if so we may defend ourselves against the things. But wilt thou say that any word is of ill-omen that betokenth some natural thing? Say that it is of ill-omen to speak of the reaping of ears of corn, for it betokenth the destruction of the ears — but not of the universe. Say that the falling of the leaves is of ill-omen, and the dried fig coming in the place of the green, and raisins in the place of grapes. For all these things are changes from the former estate to another; no destruction, but a certain appointed order and disposition. Here is parting for foreign lands, and a little change. Here is death — a greater change, not from that which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now.
NOTES
1 The allusion is to Odyssey, v. 82-4. “But he was sitting on the beach and weeping, where he was wont; and tormented his spirit with tears and groanings and woes, and wept as he gazed over the barren sea.”
2 Let him pity. — See Bk. I., ch. viii. note 3.
ON SOLITUDE.
Diss. III. xiii. 1-17. 1. Solitude is the state of one who is helpless. For he who is alone is not therefore solitary; even as he who is in a great company is not therefore not solitary. When, therefore, we have lost a brother or a son or a friend on whom we were wont 183 to rest, we say that we are left solitary, and oftentimes we say it in Rome, with such a crowd meeting us and so many dwelling about us, and, it may be, having a multitude of slaves. For the solitary man, in his conception, meaneth to be thought helpless, and laid open to all those who wish him harm. Therefore when we are on a journey we then, above all, say that we are solitary when we are fallen among thieves; for that which taketh away solitude is not the sight of a man, but of a faithful and pious and serviceable man. For if to be solitary it sufficeth to be alone, then say that Zeus is solitary in the conflagration,1 and bewails himself. Woe is me! I have neither Hera nor Athene nor Apollo, nor, in short, either brother or son or descendant or kinsman. And so some say he doth when alone in the conflagration. For they comprehend not the life of a man who is alone, setting out from a certain natural principle, that we are by nature social, and inclined to love each other, and pleased to be in the company of other men. But none the less is it needful that one find the means to this also, to be able to suffice to himself, and to be his own companion. For as Zeus is his own companion, and is content with himself, and considereth his own government, what it is, and is occupied in designs worthy of himself; thus should we be able to converse with ourselves, and feel no need of others, 184 nor want means to pass the time; but to observe the divine government, and the relations of ourselves with other things; to consider how we stood formerly towards the events that befall us, and how we stand now; what things they are that still afflict us; how these, too, may be healed, how removed; and if aught should need perfecting, to perfect it according to the reason of the case.
2. Ye see now how that Cæsar seemeth to have given us a great peace; how there are no longer wars nor battles nor bands of robbers nor of pirates, but a man may travel at every season, and sail from east to west. But can he give us peace from fever? or from shipwreck? or from fire? or earthquake? or lightning? nay, or from love? He cannot. Or from grief? He cannot. Or from envy? He cannot. Briefly, then, he cannot secure us from any of such things. But the word of the philosophers doth promise us peace even from these things. And what saith it? If ye will hearken unto me, O men, wheresover ye be, whatsoever ye do, ye shall not grieve, ye shall not be wroth, ye shall not be compelled or hindered, but ye shall live untroubled and free from every ill. Whosoever hath this peace, which Cæsar never proclaimed (for how could he proclaim it?), but which God proclaimed through His word, shall he not suffice to himself when he may be alone? for he beholdeth and considereth, 185 Now can no evil happen to me; for me there is no robber, no earthquake; all things are full of peace, full of calm; for me no way, no city, no assembly, no neighbor, no associate hath any hurt. He is supplied by one, whose part that is, with food, by another with raiment, by another with senses, by another with natural conceptions. And when it may be that the necessary things are no longer supplied, that is the signal for retreat: the door is opened, and God saith to thee, Depart.
— “Whither?
To nothing dreadful, but to the place from whence thou camest — to things friendly and akin to thee, to the elements of Being. Whatever in thee was fire shall go to fire; of earth, to earth; of air, to air; of water, to water;2 no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Coeytus, nor Phlegethon, but all things are full of Gods and Powers.3 Whoso hath these things to think on, and seeth the sun and the moon and the stars, and rejoiceth in the earth and the sea, he is no more solitary than he is helpless.
— “What, then, if one come and find me alone and slay me?”
Fool! not thee, but thy wretched body.
Frag. CLXXVI. 3. Thou art a little soul bearing up a corpse.
Diss. III. xiii. 18, 19. 4. What solitude, then, is there any longer, what lack? Why do we make ourselves worse than children, which, when 186 they are left alone, what do they? — they take shells and sand and build up somewhat, and then throw it down, and again build up something else, and so they never lack pastime. And shall I, if ye sail away from me, sit down and weep for that I am left alone and solitary? Shall I have no shells nor sand? But children do these things through their folly, and we through our wisdom are made unhappy.
NOTES
1 The conflagration. — See Preface for an account of the Stoic Doctrine of the Weltverbrennung.
2 Long suggests that the words translated “air to air” might be equally well rendered “spirit to spirit” (ὃσον πνευματίου εἰς πνευμάτιον), thus finding a place for the soul in this enumeration of the elements of man. But this metaphysical division of man’s nature into a spiritual part and a material part would have been wholly contrary to Stoic teaching, which admitted no existence that was not material. As a matter of fact, if any of the terms in this enumeration is to be understood as meaning soul or spirit, it will be fire rather than air.
3 Gods and Powers. — θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων.
AGAINST THE CONTENTIOUS AND REVENGEFUL.
Frag. LXX. 1. To suppose that we shall become contemptible in the eyes of others, unless in some way we inflict an injury on those who first showed hostility to us, is the character of most ignoble and thoughtless men. For thus we say, that a man is to be despised according to his inability to do hurt; but much rather is he to be despised according to his inability to do good.
Diss. IV. v. 1-4. 2. The wise and good man neither strives with any himself, nor in the measure of his power will he allow another to strive. And in this, as in all other things, the life of Socrates is set before us as an example; who did not only himself fly all contention, but also forbade it to others. See in Xenophon’s Symposium how many quarrels he ended; 187 and, again, how he bore with Thrasymachus, and how with Polus and with Callicles; and how he endured his wife, and how his son, which opposed him sophistical arguments. For he remembered very well that no man can command the ruling faculty of another.
Diss. IV. v. 8-21. 3. How, then, is there yet any place for contention in one so minded? For what event can amaze him? what appear strange to him? Doth he not look for even worse and more grievous things at the hands of evil men than do befall him? Doth he not count everything for gain which is short of the extreme of injury? Hath such a one reviled thee? Much thanks to him that he did not strike thee. But he did also strike me. Much thanks that he did not wound thee. But he did also wound me. Much thanks that he did not slay thee. For when did he learn, or from whom, that he was a tame animal, and affectionate to others, and that to the wrongdoer the wrongdoing itself is a heavy injury? For since he hath not learned these things, nor believes them, wherefore should he not follow that which appears to be his advantage? Thy neighbor hath flung stones! Hast thou, then, sinned in aught? But he has broken things in the house? And art thou a household vessel? Nay — but a Will.
4. What, then, hath been given thee for this occasion? To a wolf it were given to 188 bite — to fling more stones. But if thou seek what is becoming for a man, look into thy stores, see what faculties thou hast come here furnished withal. Hast thou the nature of a wild beast? the temper of revenge?
5. When is a horse in wretched case? When he is bereaved of his natural faculties; not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. When is a dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track. Is not a man, then, also thus wretched, not when he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues1 — for to this he came endowed with no faculties by Nature — but when he hath lost his honesty, his faithfulness? Surely we should meet together and lament over such a man; so great are the evils into which he hath fallen. Not, indeed, that we should lament for his birth, or for his death, but in that while yet living he hath suffered the loss of his own true possessions. I speak not of his paternal inheritance, not of his land, or his house, or his inn, or his slaves (for not one of these things is the true possession of a man, but all are alien, servile, subject, given now to some, now to others, by those that can command them); but of his human qualities, the stamps of his spirit wherewith he came into the world. Even such we seek for also on coins, and if we find them we approve the coins, and if not, we cast them away. What is the stamp of this sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Then give it me. 189 The stamp of Nero.2 Fling it away — it will not pass, it is bad. And so here too. What is the stamp of his mind? He is gentle, social, forbearing, affectionate. Come, then, I receive him, I admit him to citizenship, I receive him as a neighbor, a fellow-traveler. See to it only that he have not Nero’s stamp. Is he wrathful, revengeful, complaining? Doth he, when it may seem good to him, break the heads of all who stand in his way? Why, then, didst thou say he was a man? Shall everything be judged by the bare form? If so, then say that a wax apple is a real apple, and that it has the smell and taste of an apple. But the outward shape doth not suffice, nor are eyes and nose enough to make a man, but he is a man only if he have a man’s mind. Here is one that will not hear reason, that will not submit when he is confuted — he is an ass. In another, reverence hath died — he is worthless, anything rather than a man. This one seeketh whom he may meet and kick or bite — so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but some kind of savage beast.
Diss. IV. v. 30-32. 6. But this is the nature of every creature, to pursue the Good and fly the Evil; and to hold every man an enemy and a plotter for our woe, were it even a brother, or son, or father, who takes away from us the one, or brings us into the other. For nothing is nearer to dearer to us than the Good. It remains, therefore, if outward things be 190 good and evil, that a father is no longer the friend of his sons, nor the brother of his brother, but every place is full of enemies and plotters and slanderers. But if the only Good is that the Will should be as it ought to be, and the only Evil as it ought not, where is there then any place for strife, for reviling? For about what things shall we strive? about those that are nothing to us? and with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with men who are deceived concerning the greatest things.
Diss. IV. v.33 to
ἀγνώμονος.
Diss. IV. v. 35-37.
7.
Remembering these things, Socrates managed his own household, enduring a most shrewish wife and an undutiful son. For these doctrines make love in a household, and concord in a State, peace among nations, and gratitude towards God, with boldness in every place, as of one who hath to do with things alien to him, and of no estimation. And we are the men to write and read these things, and to applaud them when they are delivered to us, but to the belief of them we have not even come near. And therefore that saying concerning the Lacedæmonians,
“Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes,”3
will fit us too — lions in the school and foxes without.
NOTES
1 To strangle lions or embrace statues. — Hercules did the former, and ostentatious philosophers sometimes did the latter in winter-time, by way of showing their power of endurance.
2 The stamp of Nero. — I believe there is no other record than this of any rejection of Nero’s coins, and those which have come down to us are of perfectly good quality. He was declared a public enemy by the Senate, and possibly it was decreed at the same time that his coins should be withdrawn from circulation. Dion, quoted by Wise (apud Schweighäuser), reports that this was done in the case of Caligula, after the death of that tyrant.
3 Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes. — “A proverb about the Spartans, who were defeated in Asia,” notes the Scholiast on Aristoph. Pac., 1188-90.
End of Book III.